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Abstract. The paper discusses ten philosophical problems in deontic
logic: how to formally represent norms, when a set of norms may be
termed ‘coherent’, how to deal with normative conflicts, how contrary-
to-duty obligations can be appropriately modeled, how dyadic deontic
operators may be redefined to relate to sets of norms instead of pref-
erence relations between possible worlds, how various concepts of per-
mission can be accommodated, how meaning postulates and counts-as
conditionals can be taken into account, and how sets of norms may be
revised and merged. The problems are discussed from the viewpoint of
input/output logic as developed by van der Torre & Makinson. We ar-
gue that norms, not ideality, should take the central position in deontic
semantics, and that a semantics that represents norms, as input/output
logic does, provides helpful tools for analyzing, clarifying and solving the
problems of deontic logic.
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Introduction
Deontic logic is the field of logic that is concerned with normative concepts
such as obligation, permission, and prohibition. Alternatively, a deontic logic is
a formal system that attempts to capture the essential logical features of these
concepts. Typically, a deontic logic uses Ox to mean that it is obligatory that
x, (or it ought to be the case that x), and Px to mean that it is permitted, or
permissible, that x. The term ‘deontic’ is derived from the ancient Greek de´on,
meaning that which is binding or proper.
So-called Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is a normal propositional modal
logic of type KD, which means that it extends the propositional tautologies with
the axioms K : O(x→ y)→ (Ox→ Oy) and D : ¬(Ox ∧O¬x), and it is closed
under the inference rules modus ponens x, x → y/y and Necessitation x/Ox.
Prohibition and permission are defined by Fx = O¬x and Px = ¬O¬x. SDL
is an unusually simple and elegant theory. An advantage of its modal-logical
setting is that it can easily be extended with other modalities like epistemic or
temporal operators and modal accounts of actions.
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07122
Normative Multi-agent Systems
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/941
2 Hansen, Pigozzi, van der Torre
Not surprisingly for such a highly simplified theory, there are many features
of actual normative reasoning that SDL does not capture. Notorious are the so-
called ‘paradoxes of deontic logic’, which are usually dismissed as consequences of
the simplifications of SDL. E.g. Ross’s paradox [48], the counterintuitive deriva-
tion of “you ought to mail or burn the letter” from “you ought to mail the
letter”, is typically viewed as a side effect of the interpretation of ‘or’ in natural
language. Many researchers seem to believe that the subject of deontic logic may
be more or less finished, and we can focus on the use of deontic logic in computer
science and agent theory, since there is nothing important left to add to it. In
our view, this is far from the truth. On the contrary, there is a large number of
important open problems in this field of research.
In this paper we discuss ten philosophical problems in deontic logic. All of
these problems have been discussed in previous literature, and solutions have
been offered, but we believe that all of them should be considered open and
thus meriting further research. These problems are how deontic logic relates
or applies to given sets of norms (imperatives, rules, aims) (sec. 1), what it
means that a set of norms should be coherent (sec. 2), how conflicts of norms
can be taken into account (sec. 3), how deontic logic should react to contrary-
to-duty situations in which some norms are invariably violated (sec. 4), how
to interpret dyadic deontic operators that formalize ‘it ought to be that x on
conditions α’ as O(x/α) (sec. 5), how explicit permissions relate to, and change,
an agent’s obligations (sec. 6), how meaning postulates – norms that define legal
terms – and constitutive norms, that create normative states of affairs, can be
modeled (sec. 7 and 8), and how normative systems may be revised (sec. 9) and
merged (sec. 10). Our choice is motivated by our aim at providing ourselves with
models of normative reasoning of actual agents which may be human beings or
computers, but the list of open problems is by no means final. Other problems
may be considered equally important, such as how a hierarchy of norms (or of
the norm-giving authorities) is to be respected, or how general norms relate to
individual obligations, but we hope that our discussion provides the tools, and
encourages the reader, to take a fresh look at these other problems, too.
To illustrate the problems, we use Makinson & van der Torre’s input/output
logic as developed in [42], [43], [44], and we therefore assume familiarity with
this approach (cf. [45] for a good introduction). Input/output logic takes a very
general view at the process used to obtain conclusions (more generally: outputs)
from given sets of premises (more generally: inputs). While the transformation
may work in the usual way, as an ‘inference motor’ to provide logical conclusions
from a given set of premises, it might also be put to other, perhaps non-logical
uses. Logic then acts as a kind of secretarial assistant, helping to prepare the
inputs before they go into the machine, unpacking outputs as they emerge, and,
less obviously, coordinating the two. The process as a whole is one of logically
assisted transformation, and is an inference only when the central transformation
is so. This is the general perspective underlying input/output logic. It is one of
logic at work rather than logic in isolation; not some kind of non-classical logic,
but a way of using the classical one.
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1 Jørgensen’s dilemma
While normative concepts are the subject of deontic logic, it is quite difficult
how there can be a logic of such concepts at all. Norms like individual imper-
atives, promises, legal statutes, moral standards etc. are usually not viewed as
being true or false. E.g. consider imperative or permissive expressions such as
“John, leave the room!” and “Mary, you may enter now”: they do not describe,
but demand or allow a behavior on the part of John and Mary. Being non-
descriptive, they cannot meaningfully be termed true or false. Lacking truth
values, these expressions cannot – in the usual sense – be premise or conclusion
in an inference, be termed consistent or contradictory, or be compounded by
truth-functional operators. Hence, though there certainly exists a logical study
of normative expressions and concepts, it seems there cannot be a logic of norms:
this is Jørgensen’s dilemma ([30], cf. [41]).
Though norms are neither true nor false, one may state that according to the
norms, something ought to be (be done) or is permitted: the statements “John
ought to leave the room”, “Mary is permitted to enter”, are then true or false
descriptions of the normative situation. Such statements are sometimes called
normative statements, as distinguished from norms. To express principles such
as the principle of conjunction: O(x ∧ y)↔ (Ox ∧Oy), with Boolean operators
having truth-functional meaning at all places, deontic logic has resorted to inter-
preting its formulas Ox, Fx, Px not as representing norms, but as representing
such normative statements. A possible logic of normative statements may then
reflect logical properties of underlying norms – thus logic may have a “wider
reach than truth”, as von Wright [54] famously stated.
Since the truth of normative statements depends on a normative situation,
like the truth of the statement “John ought to leave the room” depends on
whether some authority ordered John to leave the room or not, it seems that
norms must be represented in a logical semantics that models such truth or fal-
sity. But semantics used to model the truth or falsity of normative statements
mostly fail to include norms. Standard deontic semantics evaluates deontic for-
mulas with respect to sets of worlds, in which some are ideal or better than
others – Ox is then defined true if x is true in all ideal or the best reachable
worlds. In our view, norms, not ideality, should take the central position from
which normative statements are evaluated. Then the following question arises,
pointedly asked by D. Makinson in [41]:
Problem 1. How can deontic logic be reconstructed in accord with the philo-
sophical position that norms are neither true nor false?
In the older literature on deontic logic there has been a veritable ‘imperativist
tradition’ of authors that have, deviating from the standard approach, in one way
or other, tried to give truth definitions for deontic operators with respect to given
sets of norms.3 The reconstruction of deontic logic as logic about imperatives
3 Cf. among others S. Kanger [32], E. Stenius [53], T. J. Smiley [51], Z. Ziemba [62],
B. van Fraassen [15], Alchourro´n & Bulygin [1] and I. Niiniluoto [47].
4 Hansen, Pigozzi, van der Torre
has been the project of one of the authors beginning with [19]. Makinson & van
der Torre’s input/output logic [42] is another reconstruction of a logic of norms
in accord with the philosophical position that norms direct rather than describe,
and are neither true nor false. Suppose that we have a set G (meant to be a set
of conditional norms), and a set A of formulas (meant to be a set of given facts).
The problem is then: how may we reasonably define the set of propositions x
making up the output of G given A, which we write out(G,A)? In particular, if
we view the output as descriptions of states of affairs that ought to obtain given
the norms G and the facts A, what is a reasonable output operation that enables
us to define a deontic O-operator that describes the normative statements that
are true given the norms and the facts, we say: the normative consequences given
the situation? One such definition is the following:
G,A |= Ox iff x ∈ out(G,A)
So Ox is true iff the output of G under A includes x. Note that this is rather
a description of how we think such an output should or might be interpreted,
whereas ‘pure’ input/output logic does not discuss such definitions. For a simple
case, let G include a conditional norm that states that if a is the case, x should
obtain (we write (a, x) ∈ G).4 If a can be inferred from A, i.e. if a ∈ Cn(A), and
z is logically implied by x, then z should be among the normative consequences
of G given A. An operation that does this is simple-minded output out1:
out1(G,A) = Cn(G(Cn(A)))
where G(B) = {y | (b, y) ∈ G and b ∈ B}. So in the given example, Oz is true
given (a, x) ∈ G, a ∈ Cn(A) and z ∈ Cn(x).
Simple-minded output may, however, not be strong enough. Sometimes, legal
argumentation supports reasoning by cases: if there is a conditional norm (a, x)
that states that an agent must bring about x if a is the case, and a norm (b, x)
that states that the same agent must also bring about x if b is the case, and a∨b
is implied by the facts, then we should be able to conclude that the agent must
bring about x. An operation that supports such reasoning is basic output out2:
out2(G,A) = ∩{Cn(G(V )) | v(A) = 1}
where v ranges over Boolean valuations plus the function that puts v(b) = 1 for
all formulae b, and V = {b | v(b) = 1}. It can easily be seen that now Ox is true
given {(a, x), (b, x)} ⊆ G and a ∨ b ∈ Cn(A).
It is quite controversial whether reasoning with conditional norms should
support ‘normative’ or ‘deontic detachment’, i.e. whether it should be accepted
that if one norm (a, x) commands an agent to make x true in conditions a,
and another norm (x, y) directs the agent to make y true given x is true, then
the agent has an obligation to make y true if a is factually true. Some would
argue that as long as the agent has not in fact realized x, the norm to bring
about y is not ‘triggered’; others would maintain that obviously the agent has
an obligation to make x∧y true given that a is true. If such detachment is viewed
4 As has become usual, an unconditional norm that commits the agent to realizing x
is represented by a conditional norm (>, x), where > means an arbitrary tautology.
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as permissible for normative reasoning, then one might use reusable output out3
that supports such reasoning:
out3(G,A) = ∩{Cn(G(B)) | A ⊆ B = Cn(B) ⊇ G(B)}
An operation that combines reasoning by cases with deontic detachment is then
reusable basic output out4:
out4(G,A) = ∩{Cn(G(V )) : v(A) = 1 and G(V ) ⊆ V }
Finally, it is often required to reconsider the facts when drawing conclusions
about what an agent must do: suppose there is an unconditional norm (>, x∨y)
to bring about x∨y, but that the agent cannot realize x as the facts include ¬x.
We would like to say that then the agent must bring about y, as this is the only
possible way left to satisfy the norm. To do this, one may use the throughput
versions out+n of any of the output operations out1, out2, out3, out4,
out+n (G,A) = outn(G
+, A),
where G+ = G∪I and I is the set of all pairs (a, a) for formulae a. The choice of
the throughput versions might appear questionable, since each makes Ox true
in case x ∈ Cn(A), i.e. it makes the unalterable facts obligatory.
It may turn out that further modifications of the output operation are re-
quired in order to produce reasonable results for normative reasoning. Also, the
proposal to employ input/output logic to reconstruct deontic logic may lead to
competing solutions, depending on what philosophical views as to what trans-
formations should be acceptable one subscribes to. All this is what input/output
logic is about. However, it should be noted that input/output logic succeeds in
representing norms as entities that are neither true nor false, while still permit-
ting normative reasoning about such entities.
2 Coherence
Consider norms which on one hand require you to leave the room, while on the
other requiring you not to leave the room at the same time. In such cases, we
are inclined to say that there is something wrong with the normative system.
This intuition is captured by the SDL axiom D : ¬(Ox ∧O¬x) that states that
there cannot be co-existing obligations to bring about x and to bring about ¬x,
or, using the standard cross-definitions of the deontic modalities: x cannot be
both, obligatory and forbidden, or: if x is obligatory then it is also permitted.
But what does this tell us about the normative system?
Since norms do not bear truth values, we cannot, in any usual sense, say that
such a set of norms is inconsistent. All we can consider is the consistency of the
output of a set of norms. We like to use the term coherence with respect to a
set of norms with consistent output, and define:
(1) A set of norms G is coherent iff ⊥ /∈ out(G,A).
However, this definition seems not quite sufficient: one might argue that one
should be able to determine whether a set of normsG is coherent or not regardless
of what arbitrary facts A might be assumed. A better definition would be (1a):
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(1a) A set of norms G is coherent iff there exists a set of formulas A such that
⊥ /∈ out(G,A).
For (1a) it suffices that there exists a situation in which the norms can be, or
could have been, fulfilled. However, consider the set of normsG = {(a, x), (a,¬x)}
that requires both x to be realized and ¬x to be realized in conditions a: it is
immediate that e.g. for all output operations out(+)n , we have ⊥ /∈ out(+)n (G,¬a):
no conflicting demands arise when ¬a is factually assumed. Yet something seems
wrong with a normative system that explicitly considers a fact a only to tie to
it conflicting normative consequences. The dual of (1a) would be
(1b) A set of norms G is coherent iff for all sets of formulas A, ⊥ /∈ out(G,A).
Now a set G with G = {(a, x), (a,¬x)} would no longer be termed coherent.
(1b) makes the claim that for no situation A, two norms (a, x), (b, y) would ever
come into conflict, which might seem too strong. We may wish to restrict A to
sets of facts that are consistent, or that are not in violation of the norms. The
question is, basically, how to distinguish situations that the norm-givers should
have taken care of, from those that describe misfortune of otherwise unhappy
circumstances. A weaker claim than (1b) would be (1c):
(1c) A set of norms G is coherent iff for all a with (a, x) ∈ G, ⊥ /∈ out(G, a).
By this change, consistency of output is required just for those factual situations
that the norm-givers have foreseen, in the sense that they have explicitly tied
normative consequences to such facts. Still, (1c) might require further modifica-
tion, since if a is a foreseen situation, and so is b, then also a ∨ b or a ∧ b might
be counted as foreseen situations for which the norms should be coherent.
However, there is a further difficulty: let G contain a norm (a,¬a) that,
for conditions in which a is unalterably true, demands that ¬a be realized. We
then have ¬a ∈ outn(G, a) for the principal output operations outn, but not
⊥ ∈ outn(G, a). Certainly the term ‘incoherent’ should apply to a normative
system that requires the agent to accomplish what is – given the facts in which
the duty arises – impossible. But since not every output operation supports
‘throughput’, i.e. the input is not necessarily included in the output, neither (1)
nor its variants implies that the agent can actually realize all propositions in the
output, though they might be logically consistent. We might therefore demand
that the output is not consistent simpliciter, but consistent with the input:
(2) A set of norms G is coherent iff ⊥ /∈ out(G,A) ∪A.
But with definition (2) we obtain the questionable result that for any case of
norm-violation, i.e. for any case in which (a, x) ∈ G and (a ∧ ¬x) ∈ Cn(A), G
must be termed incoherent – Adam’s fall would only indicate that there was
something wrong with God’s commands. One remedy would be to leave aside
all those norms that are invariably violated, i.e. instead of out(G,A) consider
out({(a, x) ∈ G | (a∧¬x) /∈ Cn(A)}, A) – but then a set G such that (a,¬a) ∈ G
would not be incoherent. It seems it is time to formally state our problem:
Problem 2. When is a set of norms to be termed ‘coherent’?
As can be seen from the discussion above, input/output logic provides the tools
to formally discuss this question, by rephrasing the question of coherence of the
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norms as one of consistency of output, and of output with input. Both notions
have been explored in the input/output framework as ‘output under constraints’:
Definition (Output under constraints) Let G be a set of conditional norms
and A and C two sets of propositional formulas. Then G is coherent in A under
constraints C when out(G,A) ∪ C is consistent.
Future study must define an output operation, determine the relevant states A,
and find the constraints C, such that any set of norms G would be appropriately
termed coherent or incoherent by this definition.
3 Normative conflicts and dilemmas
There are essentially two views on the question of normative conflicts: in the one
view, they do not exist. In the other view, conflicts and dilemmas are ubiquitous.
According to the view that normative conflicts are ubiquitous, it is obvious
that we may become the addressees of conflicting normative demands at any
time. My mother may want me to stay inside while my brother wants me to go
outside with him and play games. I may have promised to finish a paper until the
end of a certain day, while for the same day I have promised a friend to come to
dinner – now it is late afternoon and I realize I will not be able to finish the paper
if I visit my friend. Social convention may require me to offer you a cigarette
when I am lighting one for myself, while concerns for your health should make
me not offer you one. Legal obligations might collide - think of the recent case
where the SWIFT international money transfer program was required by US
anti-terror laws to disclose certain information about its customers, while under
European law that also applied to that company, it was required not to disclose
this information. Formally, let there be two conditional norms (a, x) and (b, y):
unless we have that either (x→ y) ∈ Cn(a∧ b) or (y → x) ∈ Cn(a∧ b) there is a
possible situation a∧ b∧¬(x∧ y) in which the agent can still satisfy each norm
individually, but not both norms collectively. But to assume the former for any
two norms (a, x) and (b, y) is clearly absurd.5 So any logic about norms must
take into account possible conflicts. But standard deontic logic SDL includes D:
¬(Ox ∧ O¬x) as one of its axioms, and it is not quite immediate how deontic
reasoning could accommodate conflicting norms. The problem is thus:
Problem 3.a. How can deontic logic accommodate possible conflicts of norms?
In an input/output setting one could say that there exists a conflict whenever
⊥ ∈ Cn(out(G,A) ∪A), i.e. whenever the output is inconsistent with the input:
then the norms cannot all be satisfied in the given situation. There appear to
be two ways to proceed when such inconsistencies cannot be ruled out.6. For
both, it is necessary to recur to the the notion of a maxfamily(G,A,A), i.e. the
5 Nevertheless, Lewis’ [36], [37] and Hansson’s [24] deontic semantics imply that there
exists a ‘system of spheres’, in our setting: a sequence of boxed contrary-to-duty
norms (>, x1), (¬x1, x2), (¬x1 ∧ ¬x2, x3), ... that satisfies this condition.
6 For the concepts underlying the ‘some-things-considered’ and ‘all-things-considered’
O-operators defined below cf. Horty [28] and Hansen [20], [21]
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family of all maximal H ⊆ G such that out(H,A)∪A is consistent. On this basis,
input/output logic defines the following two output operations out∪ and out∩:
out∪(G,A) =
⋃{out(H,A) | H ∈ maxfamily(G,A,A)}
out∩(G,A) =
⋂{out(H,A) | H ∈ maxfamily(G,A,A)}
Note that out∪ is a non-standard output operation that is not closed under con-
sequences, i.e. we do not generally have Cn(out∪(G,A)) = out∪(G,A). Finally
we may use the intended definition of an O-operator
G,A |= Ox iff x ∈ out(G,A)
to refer to the operations out∪ and out∩, rather than the underlying operation
out(G,A) itself, and write O∪x and O∩x to mean that x ∈ out∪(G,A) and
x ∈ out∩(G,A), respectively. Then the ‘some-things-considered’, or ‘bold’ O-
operator O∪ describes x as obligatory given the set of norms G and the facts
A if x is in the output of some H ∈ maxfamily(G,A,A), i.e. if some subset
of non-conflicting norms, or: some coherent normative standard embedded in
the norms, requires x to be true. It is immediate that neither the SDL axiom
D : ¬(Ox∧O¬x) nor the agglomeration principle C : Ox∧Oy → O(x∧y) holds
for O∪, as there may be two competing standards demanding x and ¬x to be
realized, while there may be none that demands the impossible x ∧ ¬x. On the
other hand, the ‘all-things-considered’, or ‘sceptic’, O-operator O∩ describes x
as obligatory given the norms G and the facts A if x is in the outputs of all
H ∈ maxfamily(G,A,A), i.e. it requires that x must be realized according to all
coherent normative standards. Note that by this definition, both SDL theorems
D and C are validated.
The opposite view, that normative conflicts do not exist, appeals to the very
notion of obligation: it is essential for the function of norms to direct human
behavior that the subject of the norms is capable of following them. To state
a norm that cannot be fulfilled is a meaningless use of language. To state two
norms which cannot both be fulfilled is confusing the subject, not giving him or
her directions. To say that a subject has two conflicting obligations is therefore
a misuse of the term ‘obligation’. So there cannot be conflicting obligations, and
if things appear differently, a careful inspection of the normative situation is
required that resolves the dilemma in favor of the one or other of what only
appeared both to be obligations. In particular, this inspection may reveal a
priority ordering of the apparent obligations that helps resolve the conflict (this
summarizes viewpoints prominent e.g. in Ross [49], von Wright [59], [60], and
Hare [25]). The problem that arises for such a view is then how to determine the
‘actual obligations’ in face of apparent conflicts, or, put differently, in the face
of conflicting ‘prima facie’ obligations.
Problem 3b. How can the resolution of apparent conflicts be semantically mod-
eled?
Again, both the O∪ and the O∩-operator may help to formulate and solve
the problem: O∪ names the conflicting prima facie obligations that arise from a
set of norms G in a given situation A, whereas O∩ resolves the conflict by telling
the agent to do only what is required by all maximal coherent subsets of the
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norms: so there might be conflicting ‘prima facie’ O∪-obligations, but no con-
flicting ‘all things considered’ O∩-obligations. The view that a priority ordering
helps to resolve conflicts seems more difficult to model. A good approach appears
to be to let the priorities help us to select a setP(G,A,A) of preferred maximal
subsets H ∈ maxfamily(G,A,A). We may then define the O∩-operator not with
respect to the whole of maxfamily(G,A,A), but only with respect to its selected
preferred subsets P(G,A,A). Ideally, in order to resolve all conflicts, the pri-
ority ordering should narrow down the selected sets to card(P(G,A,A)) = 1,
but this generally requires a strict ordering of the norms in G. The demand that
all norms can be strictly ordered is itself subject of philosophical dispute: some
moral requirements may be incomparable (this is Sartre’s paradox, where the
requirement that Sartre’s student stays with his ailing mother conflicts with the
requirement that the student joins the resistance against the German occupa-
tion), while others may be of equal weight (e.g. two simultaneously obtained
obligations towards identical twins, of which only one can be fulfilled). The dif-
ficult part is then to define a mechanism that determines the preferred maximal
subsets by use of the given priorities between the norms. There have been several
proposals to this effect, not all of them successful, and the reader is referred to
the discussions in Boella & van der Torre [8] and Hansen [22], [23].
4 Contrary-to-duty reasoning
Suppose we are given a code G of conditional norms, that we are presented
with a condition (input) that is unalterably true, and asked what obligations
(output) it gives rise to. It may happen that the condition is something that
should not have been true in the first place. But that is now water under the
bridge: we have to “make the best out of the sad circumstances” as B. Hansson
[24] put it. We therefore abstract from the deontic status of the condition, and
focus on the obligations that are consistent with its presence. How to determine
this in general terms, and if possible in formal ones, is the well-known problem
of contrary-to-duty conditions as exemplified by the notorious contrary-to-duty
paradoxes. Chisholm’s paradox [13] consists of the following four sentences:
(1) It ought to be that a certain man go to the assistance of his neighbors.
(2) It ought to be that if he does go, he tell them he is coming.
(3) If he does not go then he ought not to tell them he is coming.
(4) He does not go.
Furthermore, intuitively, the sentences derive (5):
(5) He ought not to tell them he is coming.
Chisholm’s paradox is a contrary-to-duty paradox, since it contains both a
primary obligation to go, and a secondary obligation not to call if the agent does
not go. Traditionally, the paradox was approached by trying to formalize each
of the sentences in an appropriate language of deontic logic, and then consider
the sets {Ox,O(x → z), O(¬x → ¬z),¬x}, or {Ox, x → Oz,¬x → O¬z,¬x},
or {Ox,O(x → z),¬x → O¬z,¬x} or {Ox, x → Oz,O(¬x → ¬z),¬x}. But
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whatever approach is taken, it turned out that either the set of formulas is
traditionally inconsistent or inconsistent in SDL, or one formula is a logical
consequence – by traditional logic or in SDL – of another formula. Yet intuitively
the natural-language expressions that make up the paradox are consistent and
independent from each other: this is why it is called a paradox. Though the
development of dyadic deontic operators as well as the introduction of temporally
relative deontic logic operators can be seen as a direct result of Chisholm’s
paradox, the paradox seems so far unsolved. The problem is thus:
Problem 4. How do we reason with contrary-to-duty obligations which are in
force only in case of norm violations?
In the input/output logic framework, the strategy for eliminating excess out-
put is to cut back the set of generators to just below the threshold of yielding
excess. To do that, input/output logic looks at the maximal non-excessive sub-
sets, as described by the following definition:
Definition (Maxfamilies) Let G be a set of conditional norms and A and
C two sets of propositional formulas. Then maxfamily(G,A,C) is the set of
maximal subsets H ⊆ G such that out(H,A) ∪ C is consistent.
For a possible solution to Chisholm’s paradox, consider the following output
operation out∩:
out∩(G,A) =
⋂{out(H,A) | H ∈ maxfamily(G,A,A)}
So an output x is in out∩(G,A) if it is in output out(H,A) of all maximal norm
subsets H ⊆ G such that out(H,A) is consistent with the input A. Let a deontic
O-operator be defined in the usual way with regard to this output:
G,A |= O∩x iff x ∈ out∩(G,A)
Furthermore, tentatively, and only for the task of shedding light on Chisholm’s
paradox, let us define an entailment relation between norms as follows:
Definition (Entailment relation) Let G be a set of conditional norms, and
(a, x) be a norm whose addition to G is under consideration. Then (a, x) is en-
tailed by G iff for all sets of propositions A, out∩(G∪{(a, x)}, A) = out∩(G,A).
So a (considered) norm is entailed by a (given) set of norms if its addition to
this set would not make a difference for any set of facts A. Finally, let us use the
following cautious definition of ‘coherence from the start’ (also called ‘minimal
coherence’ or ‘coherence per se’):
A set of norms G is ‘coherent from the start’ iff ⊥ /∈ out(G,>).
Now consider a ‘Chisholm norm set’ G = {(>, x), (x, z), (¬x,¬z), }, where (>, x)
means the norm that the man must go to the assistance of his neighbors, (x, z)
means the norm that it ought to be that if he goes he ought to tell them he is
coming, and (¬x,¬z) means the norm that if he does not go he ought not to
tell them he is coming. It can be easily verified that the norm set G is ‘coherent
from the start’ for all standard output operations out(+)n , since for these either
out(G,>) = Cn({x}) or out(G,>) = Cn({x, z}), and both sets {x} and {x, z}
are consistent. Furthermore, it should be noted that all norms in the norm set G
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are independent from each other, in the sense that no norm (a, x) ∈ G is entailed
by G \ {(a, x)} for any standard output operation out(+)n : for (>, x) we have
x ∈ out∩(G,>) but x /∈ out∩(G \ {(>, x)},>), for (x, z) we have z ∈ out∩(G, x)
but z /∈ out∩(G \ {(x, z)}, x), and for (¬x,¬z) we have ¬z ∈ out∩(G,¬x) but
¬z /∈ out∩(G\{(¬x,¬z)},>). Finally consider the ‘Chisholm fact set’ A = {¬x},
that includes as an assumed unalterable fact the proposition ¬x, that the man
will not go to the assistance of his neighbors: we have maxfamily(G,A,A) =
{G\{(>, x)}} = {{(x, z), (¬x,¬z), }} and either out(G\{(>, x)}, A) = Cn({¬z})
or out(G\{(>, x)}, A) = Cn({¬x,¬z}) for all standard output operations out(+)n ,
and so O∩¬z is true given the norm and fact sets G and A, i.e. the man must
not tell his neighbors he is coming.
5 Descriptive dyadic obligations
Dyadic deontic operators, that formalize e.g. ‘x ought to be true under conditions
a’ as O(x/a), were introduced over 50 years ago by G. H. von Wright [56]. Their
introduction was due to Prior’s paradox of derived obligation: often a primary
obligation Ox is accompanied by a secondary, ‘contrary-to-duty’ obligation that
pronounces y (a sanction, a remedy) as obligatory if the primary obligation
is violated. At the time, the usual formalization of the secondary obligation
would have been O(¬x→ y), but given Ox and the axioms of standard deontic
logic SDL, O(¬x → y) is derivable for any y. A bit later, Chisholm’s paradox
showed that formalizing the secondary obligation as ¬x→ Oy produces similarly
counterintuitive results. So to deal with such contrary-to-duty conditions, the
dyadic deontic operator O(x/a) was invented.
The perhaps best-known semantic characterization of dyadic deontic logic is
Bengt Hansson’s [24] system DSLD3, axiomatized by Spohn [52]. Hansson’s idea
was that the circumstances (the conditions a) are something which has actually
happened (or will unalterably happen) and which cannot be changed afterwards.
Ideal worlds in which ¬a is true are therefore excluded. But some worlds may
still be better than others, and there should then be an obligation to make “‘the
best out of the sad circumstances”. Consequently, Hansson presents a possible
worlds semantics in which all worlds are ordered by a preference (betterness)
relation. O(x/a) is then defined true if x is true in the best a-worlds. Here, we
intend to employ semantics that do not make use of any prohairetic betterness
relation, but that models deontic operators with regard to given sets of norms
and facts, and the question is then
Problem 5. How to define dyadic deontic operators with regard to given sets of
norms and facts?
Input/output logic assumes a set of (conditional) norms G, and a set of
invariable facts A. The facts A may describe a situation that is inconsistent
with the output out(G,A): suppose there is a primary norm (>, a) ∈ G and a
secondary norm (¬a, x) ∈ G, i.e. G = {(>, a), (¬a, x)}, and A = {¬a}. Though
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a ∈ out(G,A), it makes no sense to describe a as obligatory since a cannot be
realized any more in the given situation – no crying over spilt milk. Rather, the
output should include only the consequent of the secondary obligation x – it is
the best we can make out of these circumstances. To do so, we return to the
definitions of maxfamily(G,A,A) as the set of all maximal subsets H ⊆ G such
that out(H,A) ∪ A is consistent, and the set out∩(G,A) as the intersection of
all outputs from H ∈ maxfamily(G,A,A), i.e. out∩(G,A) = ⋂{out(H,A) | H ∈
maxfamily(G,A,A)}. We may then define:
G |= O(x/a) iff x ∈ out∩(G, {a})
Thus, relative to the set of norms G, O(x/a) is defined true if x is in the output
under a of all maximal sets H of norms such that their output under {a} is
consistent with a. In the example whereG = {(>, a), (¬a, x)} we therefore obtain
O(x/¬a) but not O(a/¬a) as being true, i.e. only the consequent of the secondary
obligation is described as obligatory in conditions ¬a.
In the above definition, the antecedent a of the dyadic formula O(x/a) makes
the inputs explicit: the truth definition does not make use of any facts other
than a. This may be unwanted; one might consider an input set A of given facts,
and employ the antecedent a only to denote an additional, assumed fact. Still,
the output should contradict neither the given nor the assumed facts, and the
output should include also the normative consequences x of a norm (a, x) given
the assumed fact a. This may be realized by the following definition:
G,A |= O(x/a) iff x ∈ out∩(G,A ∪ {a})
So, relative to a set of norms G and a set of facts A, O(x, a) is defined true if x
is in the output under A ∪ {a} of all maximal sets H of norms such that their
output under A ∪ {a} is consistent with A ∪ {a}.
Hansson’s description of dyadic deontic operators as describing defeasible
obligations that are subject to change when more specific, namely contrary-to-
duty situations emerge, may be the most prominent view, but it is by no means
the only one. Earlier authors like von Wright [57] [58] and Anderson [4] have
proposed more normal conditionals, which in particular support ‘strengthening
of the antecedent’ SA O(x/a)→ O(x/a∧ b). From an input/output perspective,
such operators can be accommodated by defining
G,A |= O(x/a) iff x ∈ out(G,A ∪ {a})
It is immediate that for all standard output operations out(+)n this definition
validates SA. The properties of dyadic deontic operators that are, like the above,
semantically defined within the framework of input/output logic, have not been
studied so far. The theorems they validate will inevitably depend on what output
operation is chosen (cf. [23] for some related conjectures).
6 Permissive norms
In formal deontic logic, permission is studied less frequently than obligation. For
a long time, it was naively assumed that it can simply be taken as a dual of
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obligation, just as possibility is the dual of necessity in modal logic. Permission
is then defined as the absence of an obligation to the contrary, and the modal
operator P defined by Px =def ¬O¬x. Today’s focus on obligations is not only
in stark contrast how deontic logic began, for when von Wright [55] started
modern deontic logic in 1951, it was the P -operator that he took as primitive,
and defined obligation as an absence of a permission to the contrary. Rather,
more and more authors have come to realize how subtle and multi-faceted the
concept of permission is. Much energy was devoted to solving the problem of
‘free choice permission’, where one may derive from the statement that one is
permitted to have a cup of tea or a cup of coffee that it is permitted to have a cup
of tea, and it is permitted to have a cup of coffee, or for short, that P (x∨y) implies
Px and Py (cf. [31]. Von Wright, in his late work starting with [61], dropped
the concept of inter-definability of obligations and permissions altogether by
introducing P -norms and O-norms, where one may call something permitted
only if it derives from the collective contents of some O-norms and at most one
P -norm. This concept of ‘strong permission’ introduced deontic ‘gaps’: whereas
in standard deontic logic SDL, O¬x∨Px is a tautology, meaning that any state
of affairs is either forbidden or permitted, von Wright’s new theory means that in
the absence of explicit P -norms only what is obligatory is permitted, and that
nothing is permitted if also O-norms are missing. Perhaps most importantly,
Bulygin [12] observed that an authoritative kind of permission must be used in
the context of multiple authorities and updating normative systems: if a higher
authority permits you to do something, a lower authority can no longer prohibit
it. Summing up, the understanding of permission is still in a less satisfactory
state than the understanding of obligation and prohibition. The problem can be
phrased thus:
Problem 6. How to distinguish various kinds of permissions and relate them to
obligations?
¿From the viewpoint of input/output logic, one may first try to define a
concept
of negative permission in the line of the classic approach. Such a definition
is the following:
G,A |= Pnegx iff ¬x /∈ out(G,A)
So something is permitted by a code iff its negation is not obligatory according
to the code and in the given situation. As innocuous and standard as such
a definition seems, questions arise as to what output operation out may be
used. Simple-minded output out1 and basic output out2 produce counterintuitive
results: consider a set of norms G of which one norm (work, tax) demands that
if I am employed then I have to pay tax. For the default situation A = {>} then
Pneg(a ∧ ¬x) is true, i.e. it is by default permitted that I am employed and do
not pay tax. Stronger output operations out3 and out4 that warrant reusable
output exclude this result, but their use in deontic reasoning is questionable for
other reasons.
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In contrast to a concept of negative permission, one may also define a concept
of ‘strong’ or ‘positive permission’. This requires a set P of explicit permissive
norms, just as G is a set of explicit obligations. As a first approximation, one
may say that something is positively permitted by a code iff the code explicitly
presents it as such. But this leaves a central logical question unanswered as to
how explicitly given permissive and obligating norms may generate permissions
that – in some sense – follow from the explicitly given norms. In the line of von
Wrights later approach, we may define:
G,P |= P stat(x/a) iff x ∈ out(G∪{(b, y)}, a) for some (b, y) ∈ P∪{(>,>)}
So there is a permission to realize x in conditions a if x is generated under
these conditions either by the norms in G alone, or the norms in G together
with some explicit permission (b, y) in P . We call this a ‘static’ version of strong
permission. For example, consider a set G consisting of the norm (work, tax), and
a set P consisting of the sole license (18y, vote) that permits all adults to take
part in political elections. Then all of the following are true: P stat(tax/work),
P stat(vote/18y), P stat(tax/work ∧ male) and also P stat(vote/¬work ∧ 18y) (so
even unemployed adults are permitted to vote).
Where negative permission is liberal, in the sense that anything is permitted
that does not conflict with ones obligations, the concept of static permission
is quite strict, as nothing is permitted that does not explicitly occur in the
norms. In between, one may define a concept of ‘dynamic permission’ that defines
something as permitted in some situation a if forbidding it for these conditions
would prevent an agent from making use of some explicit (static) permission.
The formal definition reads:
G,P |= P dyn(x/a) iff ¬y ∈ out(G∪{(a,¬x)}, b) for some y and conditions
b such that G,P |= P stat(y/b)
Consider the above static permission P stat(vote/¬work∧ 18y) that even the un-
employed adult populations is permitted to vote, generated by the sets P =
{(18y, vote)} and G = {(work, tax)}. We might also like to say, without reference
to age, that the unemployed are protected from being forbidden to vote, and in
this sense are permitted to vote, but P stat(vote/¬work) is not true. And we might
like to say that adults are protected from being forbidden to vote unless they
are employed, and in this sense are permitted to be both unemployed and take
part in elections, but also P stat(¬work∧ vote/18y) is not true. Dynamic permis-
sions allow us to express such protections, and make both P dyn(vote/¬work) and
P dyn(¬work∧vote/18y) true: if either (¬work,¬vote) or (18y, (¬work→ ¬vote))
were added to G we would obtain ¬vote as output in conditions ¬work∧ 18y) in
spite of the fact that, as we have seen, G,P |= P stat(vote/¬work ∧ 18y).
There are, ultimately, a number of questions for all these concepts of permis-
sions that have been further explored in [44]. Other kinds of permissions have
been discussed from an input/output perspective in the literature, too, for ex-
ample permissions as exceptions of obligations [8]. But it seems input/output
logic is able to help clarify the underlying concepts of permission better than
traditional deontic semantics.
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7 Meaning postulates and intermediate concepts
To define a deontic operator of individual obligation seems straightforward if the
norm in question is an individual command or act of promising. For example, if
you are the addressee α of the following imperative sentence
(1) You, hand me that screwdriver, please.
and you consider the command valid, then what you ought to do is to hand
the screwdriver in question to the person β uttering the request. In terms of
input/output logic, let x be the proposition that α hands the screwdriver to β:
with the set of norms G = {(>, x)}, the set of facts A = {>}, and the truth
definition Ox iff x ∈ out(A,G): then we obtain that Ox is true, i.e. it is true
that it ought to be that α hands the screwdriver to β.
Norms that belong to a legal system are more complex, and thus more difficult
to reason about. Consider, for example
(2) An act of theft is punished by a prison sentence not exceeding 5 years or a
fine.
Things are again easy if you are a judge and you know that the accused in front
of you has committed an act of theft – then you ought to hand out a verdict that
commits the accused to pay a fine or to serve a prison sentence not exceeding 5
years. But how does the judge arrive at the conclusion that an act of theft has
been committed? ‘Theft’ is a legal term that is usually accompanied by a legal
definition such as the following one:
(3) Someone commits an act of theft if that person has taken a movable object
from the possession of another person into his own possession with the
intention to own it, and if the act occurred without the consent of the
other person or some other legal authorization.
It is noteworthy that (3) is not a norm in the strict sense – it does not prescribe or
allow a behavior – but rather a stipulative definition, or, in more general terms,
a meaning postulate that constitutes the legal meaning of theft. Such sentences
are often part of the legal code. They share with norms the property of being
neither true nor false. The significance of (3) is that it decomposes the complex
legal term ‘theft’ into more basic legal concepts. These concepts are again the
subject of further meaning postulates, among which may be the following:
(4) A person in the sense of the law is a human being that has been born.
(5) A movable object is any physical object that is not a person or a piece of
land.
(6) A movable object is in the possession of a person if that person is able to
control the uses and the location of the object.
(7) The owner of an object is – within the limits of the law – entitled to do
with it whatever he wants, namely keep it, use it, transfer possession or
ownership of the object to another person, and destroy or abandon it.
Not all of definitions (4)-(7) may be found in the legal statutes, though they
may be viewed as belonging to the normative system by virtue of having been
accepted in legal theory and judicial reasoning. They constitute ‘intermediate
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concepts’: they link legal terms (person, movable object, possession etc.) to words
describing natural facts (human being, born, piece of land, keep an object etc.).
Any proper representation of legal norms must include means of represent-
ing meaning postulates that define legal terms, decompose legal terms into more
basic legal terms, or serve as intermediate concepts that link legal terms to
terms that describe natural facts. But for deontic logic, with its standard pos-
sible worlds semantics, a comprehensive solution to the problem of representing
meaning postulates is so far lacking (cf. Lindahl [39]). The problem is thus:
Problem 7. How can meaning postulates and intermediate terms be modeled in
semantics for deontic logic reasoning?
The representation of intermediate concepts is of particular interest, since
such concepts arguably reduce the number of implications required for the tran-
sition from natural facts to legal consequences and thus serve an economy of
expression (cf. Lindahl & Odelstad [40]). Lindahl & Odelstad use the term ‘own-
ership’ as an example to argue as follows: let F1, ..., Fp be descriptions of some
situations in which a person α acquires ownership of an object γ, e.g. by acquir-
ing it from some other person β, finding it, building it from owned materials,
etc., and let C1, ..., Cn be among the legal consequences of α’s ownership of γ,
e.g. freedom to use the object, rights to compensation when the object is dam-
aged, obligations to maintain the object or pay taxes for it etc. To express that
each fact Fi has the consequence Cj , p×n implications are required. The intro-
duction of the term Ownership(x, y) reduces the number of required implications
to p+ n: there are p implications that link the facts F1, ..., Fp to the legal term
Ownership(x, y), and n implications that link the legal term Ownership(x, y) to
each of the legal consequences C1, ..., Cn. The argument obviously does not apply
to all cases: one implication (F1∨...∨Fp)→ (C1∧...∧Cn) may often be sufficient
to represent the case that a variety of facts F1, ..., Fp has the same multitude
of legal consequences C1, ..., Cn. However, things may be different when norms
that link a number of factual descriptions to the same legal consequences stem
from different normative sources, may come into conflict with other norms, can
be overridden by norms of higher priority, or be subject of individual exemption
by norms that grant freedoms or licenses: in these cases, the norms must be
represented individually. So it seems worthwhile to consider ways to incorporate
intermediate concepts into a formal semantics for deontic logic.
In an input/output framework, a first step could be to employ a separate set
T of theoretical terms, namely meaning postulates, alongside the set G of norms.
Let T consists of intermediates of the form (a, x), where a is a factual sentence
(e.g. that β is in possession of γ, and that α and β agreed that α should have γ,
and that β hands γ to α), and x states that some legal term obtains (e.g. that
α is now owner of γ). To derive outputs from the set of norms G, one may then
use A ∪ out(T,A) as input, i.e. the factual descriptions together with the legal
statements that obtain given the intermediates T and the facts A.
It may be of particular interest to see that such a set of intermediates may
help resolve possible conflicts in the law. Let (>,¬dog) be a statute that forbids
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dogs on the premises, but let there also be a higher order principle that no
blind person may be required to give up his or her guide dog. Of course the
conflict may be solved by modifying the statute (e.g. add a condition that the
dog in question is not a guide dog), but then modifying a statute is usually
not something a judge, faced with such a norm, is allowed to do: the judge’s
duty is solely to consider the statute, interpret it according to the known or
supposed will of the norm-giver, and apply it to the given facts. The judge
may then come to the conclusion that a fair and considerate norm-giver would
not have meant the statute to apply to guide dogs, i.e. the term “dog” in the
statute is a theoretical term whose extension is smaller than the natural term.
So the statute must be re-interpreted as reading (>,¬tdog) with the additional
intermediate (dog ∧ ¬guidedog, tdog) ∈ T , and thus no conflict arises for the
case of blind persons that want to keep their guide dog. While this seems to be
a rather natural view of how judicial conflict resolution works (the example is
taken from an actual court case), the exact process of creating and modifying
theoretical terms in order to resolve conflicts must be left to further study.
8 Constitutive norms
Constitutive norms like counts-as conditionals are rules that create the possibil-
ity of or define an activity. For example, according to Searle [50], the activity of
playing chess is constituted by action in accordance with these rules. Chess has
no existence apart from these rules. The institutions of marriage, money, and
promising are like the institutions of baseball and chess in that they are sys-
tems of such constitutive rules or conventions. They have been identified as the
key mechanism to normative reasoning in dynamic and uncertain environments,
for example to realize agent communication, electronic contracting, dynamics of
organizations, see, e.g., [9].
Problem 8. How to define counts-as conditionals and relate them to obligations
and permissions?
For Jones and Sergot [29], the counts-as relation expresses the fact that a
state of affairs or an action of an agent “is a sufficient condition to guarantee
that the institution creates some (usually normative) state of affairs”. They
formalize this introducing a conditional connective⇒s to express the “counts-as”
connection holding in the context of an institution s. They characterize the logic
of ⇒s as a conditional logic, with axioms for agglomeration ((x ⇒s y)& (x ⇒s
z))⊃ (x ⇒s (y ∧ z)), left disjunction ((x ⇒s z)& (y ⇒s z))⊃ ((x ∨ y) ⇒s z) and
transitivity ((x ⇒s y)& (y ⇒s z))⊃ (x ⇒s z). The flat fragment can be phrased
as an input/output logic as follows [7].
Definition 1. Let L be a propositional action logic with ` the related notion of
derivability and Cn the related consequence operation Cn(x) = {y | x ` y}. Let
CA be a set of pairs of L, {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}, read as ‘x1 counts as y1’, etc.
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Moreover, consider the following proof rules conjunction for the output (AND),
disjunction of the input (OR), and transitivity (T) defined as follows:
(x, y1), (x, y2)
(x, y1 ∧ y2) AND
(x1, y), (x2, y)
(x1 ∨ x2, y) OR
(x, y1), (y1, y2)
(x, y2)
T
For an institution s, the counts-as output operator outCA is defined as closure
operator on the set CA using the rules above, together with a silent rule that
allows replacement of logical equivalents in input and output. We write (x, y) ∈
outCA(CA, s). Moreover, for X ⊆ L, we write y ∈ outCA(CA, s,X) if there is a
finite X ′ ⊆ X such that (∧X ′, y) ∈ outCA(CA, s), indicating that the output y is
derived by the output operator for the input X, given the counts-as conditionals
CA of institution s. We also write outCA(CA, s, x) for outCA(CA, s, {x}).
Example 1. If for some institution s we have CA = {(a, x), (x, y)}, then we have
outCA(CA, s, a) = {x, y}.
There is presently no consensus on the logic of counts-as conditionals, probably
due to the fact that the concept is not studied in depth yet. For example, the
adoption of the transitivity rule T for their logic is criticized by Artosi et al. [5].
Jones and Sergot say that “we have been unable to produce any counter-instances
[of transitivity], and we are inclined to accept it”.7
The main issue in defining constitutive norms like counts-as conditionals is
defining their relation with regulative norms like obligations and permissions.
Boella and van der Torre [7] use the notion of a logical architecture combining
several logics into a more complex logical system, also called logical input/output
nets (or lions).
The notion of logical architecture naturally extends the input/output logic
framework, since each input/output logic can be seen as the description of a
‘black box’. In the above figure there are boxes for counts-as conditionals (CA),
institutional constraints (IC), obligating norms (O) and explicit permissions (P).
The norm base (NB) component contains sets of norms or rules, which are used
in the other components to generate the component’s output from its input. The
7 Neither of these authors considers replacing transitivity by cumulative transitivity
(CT): ((x⇒s y)&(x ∧ y ⇒s z))⊃ (x⇒s z), that characterizes operations out3, out4
of input/output logic.
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figure shows that the counts-as conditionals are combined with the obligations
and permissions using iteration, that is, the counts-as conditionals produce insti-
tutional facts, which are input for the norms. Roughly, if we write out(CA,G,A)
for the output of counts-as conditionals together with obligations, out(G,A) for
obligations as before, then out(CA,G,A) = out(G, outCA(CA,A)).
There are many open issues concerning constitutive norms, since their logical
analysis has not attracted much attention yet. How to distinguish among various
kinds of constitutive norms? How are constitutive norms (x counts as y) distin-
guished from classifications (x is a y)? What is the relation with intermediate
concepts?
9 Revision of a set of norms
In general, a code G of regulations is not static, but changes over time. For
example, a legislative body may want to introduce new norms or to eliminate
some existing ones. A different (but related) type of change is the one induced
by the fusion of two (or more) codes as it is addressed in the next section.
Little work exists on the logic of the revision of a set of norms. To the best
of our knowledge, Alchourro´n and Makinson were the first to study the changes
of a legal code [2,3]. The addition of a new norm n causes an enlargement of
the code, consisting of the new norm plus all the regulations that can be derived
from n. Alchourro´n and Makinson distinguish two other types of change. When
the new norm is incoherent with the existing ones, we have an amendment of
the code: in order to coherently add the new regulation, we need to reject those
norms that conflict with n. Finally, derogation is the elimination of a norm n
together with whatever part of G implies n.
In [2] a “hierarchy of regulations” is assumed. Few years earlier, Alchourro´n
and Bulygin [1] already considered the Normenordnung and the consequences of
gaps in this ordering. For example, in jurisprudence the existence of precedents
is an established method to determine the ordering among norms.
However, although Alchourro´n and Makinson aim at defining change opera-
tors for a set of norms of some legal system, the only condition they impose on
G is that it is a non-empty and finite set of propositions. In other words, a norm
x is taken to be simply a formula in propositional logic. Thus, they suggest that
“the same concepts and techniques may be taken up in other areas, wherever
problems akin to inconsistency and derogation arise” ([2], p. 147).
This explains how their work (together with Ga¨rdenfors’ analysis of counter-
factuals) could ground that research area that is now known as belief revision.
Belief revision is the formal studies of how a set of propositions changes in view
of a new information that may cause an inconsistency with the existing beliefs.
Expansion, revision and contraction are the three belief change operations that
Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson identified in their approach (called AGM)
and that have a clear correspondence with the changes on a system of norms we
mentioned above. Hence, the following question needs to be addressed:
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Problem 9. How to revise a set of regulations or obligations? Does belief revision
offer a satisfactory framework for norms revision?
Some of the AGM axioms seem to be rational requirements in a legal context,
whereas they have been criticized when imposed on belief change operators. An
example is the success postulate, requiring that a new input must always be
accepted in the belief set. It is reasonable to impose such a requirement when
we wish to enforce a new norm or obligation. However, it gives rise to irrational
behaviors when imposed to a belief set, as observed for instance in [16].
On the other hand, when we turn to a proper representation of norms, like in
the input/output logic framework, the AGM principles prove to be too general to
deal with the revision of a normative system. For example, one difference between
revising a set of propositions and revising a set of regulations is the following:
when a new norm is added, coherence may be restored modifying some of the
existing norms, not necessarily retracting some of them. The following example
will clarify this point:
Example. If we have {(>, a), (a, b)} and we have that c is an exception to the
obligation to do b, then we need to retract (c, b). Two possible solutions are
{(¬c, a), (a, b)} or {(>, a), (a ∧ ¬c, b)}.
Future research must investigate whether general patterns in the revision of
norms exist and how to formalize them.
10 Merging sets of norms
In the previous section we have seen that the change over time of a system
of norms raises questions that cannot be properly answered within the belief
revision framework. We now want to turn to another type of change, that is the
aggregation of regulations. This problem has been only recently addressed in the
literature and therefore the findings are still very partial.
The first noticeable thing is the lack of general agreement about where the
norms that are to be aggregated come from:
1. some works focus on the merging of conflicting norms that belong to the
same normative system [14];
2. other works assume that the regulations to be fused belong to different sys-
tems [11]; and finally
3. some authors provide patterns of possible rules to be combined, and consider
both cases (1) and (2) above [18].
The first situation seems to be more a matter of coherence of the whole system
rather than a genuine problem of fusion of norms. However, such approaches have
the merit to reveal the tight connections between fusion of norms, non-monotonic
logics and defeasible deontic reasoning. The initial motivation for the study of
belief revision was the ambition to model the revision of a set of regulations. On
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the contrary, the generalization of belief revision to belief merging is exclusively
dictated by the goal to tackle the problem — arising in computer science —
of combining information from different sources. The pieces of information are
represented in a formal language and the aim is to merge them in an (ideally)
unique knowledge base.8
Problem 10. Can the belief merging framework deal with the problem of merging
sets of norms?
If (following Alchourro´n and Makinson) we assume that norms are uncondi-
tional, then we could expect to use standard merging operators to fuse sets of
norms. Yet, not only once we consider conditional norms, as in the input/output
logic framework, problems arise again. But also, most of the fusion procedures
proposed in the literature seem to be inadequate for the scope.
To see why this is the case, we need to explain the merging approach in few
words. Let us assume that we have a finite number of belief bases K1,K2, . . . ,Kn
to merge. IC is the belief base whose elements are the integrity constraints (i.e.,
any condition that we want the final outcome to satisfy). Given a multi-set
E = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kn} and IC, a merging operator F is a function that assigns
a belief base to E and IC. Let FIC(E) be the resulting collective base from the
IC fusion on E.
Fusion operators come in two types: model-based and syntax-based. The idea
of a model-based fusion operator is that models of FIC(E) are models of IC,
which are preferred according to some criterion depending on E. Usually the
preference information takes the form of a total pre-order on the interpretations
induced by a notion of distance d(w,E) between an interpretation w and E.
Syntax-based merging operators are usually based on the selection of some
consistent subsets of E [6,34]. The bases Ki in E can be inconsistent and the
result does not depend on the distribution of the wffs over the members of the
group.9
Finally, the model-based aggregation operators for bases of equally reliable
sources can be of two sorts. On the one hand, there are majoritarian operators
that are based on a principle of distance-minimization [38]. On the other hand,
there are egalitarian operators, which look at the distribution of the distances
in E [33]. These two types of merging try to capture two intuitions that often
guide the aggregation of individual preferences into a social one. One option is
to let the majority decide the collective outcome, and the other possibility is to
equally distribute the individual dissatisfaction.
Obviously, these intuitions may well serve in the aggregation of individual
knowledge bases or individual preferences, but have nothing to say when we try
to model the fusion of sets of norms. Hence, for this purpose, syntactic merging
operators may be more appealing. Nevertheless, the selection of a coherent subset
8 See [35] for a survey on logic-based approaches to information fusion.
9 [34] refers the term ‘combination’ to the syntax-based fusion operators to distinguish
them from the model-based approaches.
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depends on additional information like an order of priority over the norms to be
merged, or some other meta-principles.
As the application of belief merging to the aggregation of sets of norms
turned out to be unfeasible, an alternative approach is to generalize existing
belief change operators to merging rules. This is the approach followed in [11],
where merging operators defined using a consolidation operation and possibilistic
logic are applied to the aggregation of conditional norms in an input/output
logic framework. However, at this preliminary stage, it is not clear whether such
methodology is more fruitful for testing the flexibility of existing operators to
tackle other problems than the ones they were created for, or if this approach
can really shed some light to the new riddle at hand.
A different perspective is taken in [18]. Here, real examples from the Belgian-
French bilateral agreement preventing double taxation are considered. These are
fitted into a taxonomy of the most common legal rules with exceptions, and the
combination of each pair of norms is analyzed. Moreover, both the situations in
which the regulations come from the same system and those in which they come
from different ones are contemplated, and some general principles are derived.
Finally, a merging operator for rules with abnormality propositions is proposed.
A limit of Gre´goire’s proposal is that only the aggregation of rules with the same
consequence is taken into account and, in our opinion, this neglects other sorts
of conflicts that may arise, as we see now.
The call for non-monotonic reasoning in the treatment of contradictions is
also in Cholvy and Cuppens’ [14]. A logic to reason when several contradictory
norms are merged is presented. The proposal assumes an order of priority among
the norms to be merged and this order is also the way to solve the incoherence.
Even though this is quite a strong assumption, Cholvy and Cuppens’ work take
into consideration a broader type of incoherence than in [18]. In their example,
an organization that works with secret documents has two rules. R1 is “It is
obligatory that any document containing some secret information is kept in a
safe, when nobody is using this document”. R2 is “If nobody has used a given
document for five years, then it is obligatory to destroy this document by burning
it”. As they observe, in order to deduce that the two rules are conflicting, we
need to introduce the constraint that keeping a document and destroying it
are contradictory actions. That is, the notion of coherence between norms can
involve information that are not norms.
11 Conclusion: Deontic logic in context
In this paper we discussed problems of deontic logic that should be considered
open and how input/output logic may be useful for analyzing these problems and
finding fresh solutions. Jørgensen’s dilemma might be overcome by distinguish-
ing operations with norms, like the output out(G,A) of a set of norms G under
conditions A, from truth definitions that define what ought to obtain or be done
given these norms and conditions. Coherence of a set of norms might be defined
with respect to output under constraints, meaning that the set of norms should
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not generate output for certain conditions that is inconsistent with these con-
straints. Normative conflicts may be overcome by considering coherent subsets
of norms and their output, or such subsets that are preferred given a prior-
ity ordering of the norms. Likewise, contrary-to-duty obligations, that obtain in
conditions that represent violations, may be modeled by considering only output
that is consistent with the input, i.e. the given conditions. Input/output logic
provides two possible definitions of dyadic deontic operators, which reconstruct
past discussions on whether such operators should be defeasible (in particular
in contrary-to-duty conditions), or support strengthening of the antecedent that
derives O(x/a ∧ b) from O(x/a). Input/output logic may take into account not
just sets of obligating norms, but also explicit permissions, and thus helps shed
light on the distinction between weak (negative) permission, where something is
permitted if it does not conflict with the norms, and strong (positive) permission
which requires an explicit license by the norm-givers. Meaning postulates and
intermediate terms, common in legal reasoning but largely ignored by traditional
deontic literature, can be taken into account by considering generators T that
link natural facts to theoretical terms occurring in the norms, and for counts-as
conditionals we may use a separate set of generators (normative institutions)
that models how norms are created given an input of natural facts. Finally the
questions of how to revise and merge given sets of norms may be approached by
preparing the generators (norms) with the aid of standard revision and merging
operators.
Lately, normative systems and deontic logic have received widespread at-
tention in multiagent systems and artificial intelligence. A normative multiagent
system is “a multiagent system together with normative systems in which agents
can decide whether to follow the explicitly represented norms, and the normative
systems specify how and in which extent the agents can modify the norms” [10].
Deontic logic, that attempts to formalize the normative consequences given a set
of norms and a given situation, can be a helpful tool for devising such systems. In
such a general setting, a setting of ‘deontic logic in context’, many new problems
arise: how do deontic truths feature in agent planning and decision making? how
do they interact with agent desires, goals, preferences and intentions? how do
they feature in communication? how do we model the change of obligations over
time, when agents violate or discharge their obligations, when the underlying
norms are modified or retracted or when new norms come into existence? The
clarification and solution of the problems outlined above, and others, may serve
as a first step to make deontic logic fit to become a working component in such
a larger setting.
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